Statistical screening for cartel-like pricing · generated 2026-06-22
How often rivals selling the same product post the very same price.
Spread of prices across retailers per product. Healthy competition shows dispersion; a cartel compresses it (bars piled on the left = suspicious).
Share of shared products where the two chains post an identical price.
| Retailer A | Retailer B | Shared | Identical | Ratio CV |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| kritikos | masoutis | 1938 | 80.8% | 0.1093 |
| masoutis | synka | 3470 | 44.9% | 0.1125 |
| kritikos | synka | 1803 | 41.3% | 0.1561 |
| masoutis | sklavenitis | 3054 | 39.4% | 0.1982 |
| colruyt | delhaize | 49 | 34.7% | 0.1479 |
| kritikos | sklavenitis | 2151 | 32.5% | 0.2115 |
| lidl | sklavenitis | 842 | 30.3% | 0.2154 |
| galaxias | masoutis | 3262 | 26.7% | 0.2213 |
| galaxias | kritikos | 1944 | 22.4% | 0.2319 |
| galaxias | sklavenitis | 2960 | 20.6% | 0.2058 |
Clustering at psychological endings (.99/.95/.00) hints at shared recommended pricing.
Where to investigate — not findings of wrongdoing.
Same product on offer at multiple chains at once.
Built from a single price snapshot via the public PosoKanei API. The screens follow the empirical "collusion markers" competition authorities use to scope investigations: price identity, low dispersion, pairwise matching, and focal-point clustering. A near-constant price ratio between two chains (low ratio CV) is consistent with resale-price maintenance / MSRP rather than a horizontal cartel.
None of these metrics prove collusion. Rule out common-cost shocks (wholesale, energy, FX, VAT) and common ownership before drawing conclusions, and corroborate with time-series analysis of synchronized price changes.